NOTICE OF COMMERCIAL AFFIDAVIT AND ASSEVERATION AND COMMERCIAL CLAIM OF LIEN


BDAD-020900-SUPRA


Exhibit “A”

Vis­i­tor Sta­tis­tics: City of Brant­ford and Brant­ford Power inc.

COMMERCIAL AFFIDAVIT AND ASSEVERATION (SUPRAExhibit “A” Sent reg­is­tered mail and Email to the City of Brant­ford and their ten­dered Police Ser­vices, and Ken’s Towing.

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PRIVATE NATIONAL LAW AND CONFLICT OF LAW

INTRODUCTION

This arti­cle is intended to give the reader a fun­da­men­tal under­stand­ing and basic guide to study the Con­flicts of Law when assert­ing National Sov­er­eignty through Pri­vate National Law, or using Domes­tic or For­eign Law to seek rem­edy when a Con­flict of Law has occurred.

FORWARD

In this review we have listed many dis­cussed terms and processes that are used to show the mis­ap­pli­ca­tion of law and firm line of sep­a­ra­tion of author­ity in the domestic/private/foreign rule of law, and fun­da­men­tals of each native con­sti­tu­tion e.g. Cana­dian con­sti­tu­tion vs Kanianke’haka “pri­vate Indian” con­sti­tu­tion, our find­ings have shown that many para­doxes exist within the greater com­mu­nity at large when assert­ing diverse rule of law.

How­ever, since the spirit of the ever present Indian nations have never been extin­guished or right­fully replaced, the pri­vate Indian con­tinue to sur­vive and har­vest the abun­dance of the col­lec­tive spirit and nature, assert­ing the found­ing and fun­da­men­tal prin­ci­pals and way of the one dish, and the two row wampum; “per­pet­ual reser­va­tion of rights, bal­ance of all things”.The Indian nations are pre­sumed under Canada’s con­sti­tu­tion and cor­po­rate umbrella that dom­i­nates the local and domes­tic sys­tems of finance and gov­er­nance thus encroach­ing the pri­vate Indian right and pirat­ing the nature of the host Indian nations breach­ing the peace and guest-friend rela­tion­ship, for exam­ple the use of the 1969 “Trudeau/Chrétien” White Papers to coer­cively extend the Cana­dian cit­i­zen­ship onto the pri­vate Indian nations with­out del­e­ga­tion of author­ity from the pri­vate nations.

In sys­tem­atic efforts to silence and ter­mi­nate the Indian born rights, Canada has devel­oped spe­cific courts, ter­ri­to­r­ial injunc­tions, inclu­sive leg­is­la­tion and pas­sages in the BNA act in effort to gain juris­dic­tion by mutual use of these exploitive ele­ments built as a tool for con­ver­sion, though Indian nations have sur­vived insur­rec­tions and trea­son, 1969 White Paper on Indi­ans, 1924 raids of pri­vate coun­cil cham­bers, usurpa­tion of the authen­tic coun­cils of the Indian nations with­out del­e­ga­tion of author­ity or qual­i­fied rep­re­sen­ta­tion.
Non-Delegation of Authority

It is this writ­ers analy­sis that given the infor­ma­tion ref­er­enced in this paper the Para­mount ques­tion is:

Where is the real evi­dence, a law­ful del­e­ga­tion of author­ity order grant­ing the “company/agent” author­ity to make any legal or law­ful deter­mi­na­tion on behalf of “the peo­ple of the ___”/non-company-members?

Was author­ity includ­ing lands assigned, granted, con­veyed with proper records of this event, when a ques­tion is stated in the pos­i­tive tense the pri­vate nation mak­ing the claim has the bur­den to prove that they did not grant such power or sur­ren­der inter­ests in the lands or more impor­tantly our blood rela­tion, the Indian nations would have to dis­cover evi­dence to bring proof of this claim.

How­ever with the early record keep­ing prac­tices and the years of theft of the many records from raids of the Indian coun­cil cham­bers and record cus­to­di­ans, this real­iza­tion and above ques­tion must be brought to atten­tion by bring­ing this state­ment as formed in the neg­a­tive tense to assert the pos­i­tive as rephrased below:

It is fact that we have no record or evi­dence that any law­ful del­e­ga­tion of author­ity includ­ing the lands grant­ing the “com­pany” an order of author­ity to make spe­cific legal or law­ful deter­mi­na­tion on behalf of “the peo­ple of the ___”, and we believe no such evi­dence exists. If you have real evi­dence that the state­ment herein is in err, pro­vide cor­rec­tions for the record, oth­er­wise the record stands as stated herein.

The power of this state­ment not only comes from the usurper hav­ing to admit and cor­rect the record but to exclude and vacate the pre­sump­tions of good faith. he must prove that author­ity was either del­e­gated law­fully or the pri­vate Indian nations con­sti­tu­tions and lands have been usurped with­out del­e­ga­tion of author­ity; an act of con­sti­tu­tional van­dal­ism, trea­son, mis­rep­re­sen­ta­tion, con­ti­nen­tal and spir­i­tual war­fare, abduc­tion, hid­den enslave­ment and influ­ence of the mind:

If proof of del­e­ga­tion of author­ity exits and the “com­pany” pro­duces a doc­u­ment they admit to agent sta­tus, show­ing that we can upgrade or down­grade the del­e­gated mandate.

If they do not have proof of del­e­ga­tion of author­ity they have acted in con­flict of law, and act­ing out­side the scope of their offices, show­ing that the Indian nations have been wronged by; con­sti­tu­tional van­dal­ism, trea­son, mis­rep­re­sen­ta­tion, con­ti­nen­tal and spir­i­tual war­fare, abduc­tion, hid­den enslave­ment and influ­ence of the mind:.

Until the ques­tion of del­e­ga­tion of author­ity includ­ing land can be answered in favor of the “com­pany” the con­tent in this review should remain for­eign and sep­a­rate from the nature and fun­da­men­tal con­sti­tu­tion of the pri­vate Indian nations.

Fair trial and con­flict of law

This term “fair trial” is one of the most unre­al­is­tic path to rule of law for the pri­vate Indian, when a Cana­dian cit­i­zen attends court he may pose the questions:

Is the Cana­dian cit­i­zen enti­tled to a fair trial, Answer: YES, sec­ondly, can he have a fair trial if there is a con­flict of inter­est, Answer: NO, for exam­ple; judge and attor­ney both rep­re­sent the “com­pany” there is con­flict of inter­est, but then what is a con­flict of law?

Juris­dic­tion of Cana­dian and provin­cial courts extends only to the Cana­dian or provin­cial cit­i­zen and lastly by the for­eign national vol­un­teer­ing through his per­sonal will­ful choice of law or if a nation-tonation mutual agree­ment to extra­dite exists, When an Indian is brought before the for­eign court under the rep­re­sen­ta­tion of a Cana­dian attor­ney the Indian is then pre­sumed to have law­ful con­sti­tu­tional rep­re­sen­ta­tion under the Cana­dian rule of law grant­ing the court proper juris­dic­tion, con­vert­ing the orig­i­nal right to the pri­vate Indian con­sti­tu­tion or pri­vate law, by choice or fraud.

More­over, by will­fully hir­ing an Cana­dian attor­ney it is assumed that the pri­vate Indian has for­feited his right to his fun­da­men­tal con­sti­tu­tion and inherency to his cus­tom­ary rights and pri­vate rule of law.
How­ever this ulti­mately leads the next ques­tion can the pri­vate Indian [for exam­ple under the Kanianke’haka con­sti­tu­tion] have a fair trial by a Cana­dian jury?

This ques­tion has been answered in the above para­graphs and should be evi­dent by now to the reader that the court does not offer legit­i­mate con­sti­tu­tional rep­re­sen­ta­tion for the pri­vate Indian, and since the court is lim­ited to the juris­dic­tion of the Cana­dian cit­i­zens, the pri­vate Indian does not have due process of trial by his peers, due to the fact that the require­ments of jury duty; to be a cit­i­zen of Canada in good standing.

The source of con­flict is the tyran­ni­cal appli­ca­tion of the Cana­dian con­sti­tu­tion onto the pri­vate Indian cre­at­ing a con­sti­tu­tional para­dox, it is also evi­dent that the jury is also in con­flict of law as for­eign cit­i­zens or “non-peers”.

It is now clear that the courts can not offer legit­i­mate or law­ful forum to address indif­fer­ences of domes­tic and for­eign law for the pri­vate Indian, this is when con­vert­ing juris­dic­tion from pri­vate law to Cana­dian law becomes a crit­i­cal col­lec­tive gov­ern­men­tal and cor­po­rate pro­tec­tion Maneu­ver to res­cue Cana­dian soci­ety and the pub­lic and pri­vate invest­ments through its con­ver­sion­ary process and judi­cial man­age­ment of poten­tial risk of harm from loss of rep­u­ta­tion and invest­ment per­cep­tion from the influ­ence of any and all per­cep­tive or hid­den rights includ­ing lands of the pri­vate Indian.

Exam­ple: Brant­ford Injunc­tion 2011 Justice-Harrison Arrells’ stated that “I find it as a fact …For more than 150 years, the Six Nations did noth­ing to indi­cate to inno­cent third-party pur­chasers that there was any prob­lem with title to their lands”, “the econ­omy of this small city is at risk; the employ­ment of mem­bers of the com­mu­nity are like­wise at risk; the rep­u­ta­tion of the city as a place to live, work and invest is at risk; all as a result of the city being unable to reg­u­late devel­op­ment, pro­vide a conflict-free envi­ron­ment for invest­ment, employ­ment and the rais­ing of fam­i­lies, and the inabil­ity of the city to ensure to local a res­i­dents and the invest­ment com­mu­nity that the rule of law prevails.”

By using Cana­dian courts, the objec­tive will always be focused on min­i­miza­tion of the poten­tial loss in con­trol of national, cor­po­rate and domes­tic assets, the Cana­dian gov­ern­ment holds the desire to pre­vent or delay a con­sti­tu­tional cri­sis, lim­it­ing the fall­out and loss of con­trol of every provin­cial, regional, munic­i­pal, and city strong­hold, in what may be observed as its national duty to rescue.

In the above exam­ple the court con­verted the source of the risk through faulty opin­ion and mis­rep­re­sen­ta­tion of fact to reas­sure the pub­lic and malign pub­lic per­cep­tion of the Indian right includ­ing the lands.

duty to res­cue arises where a per­son [Canada] cre­ates a haz­ardous sit­u­a­tion [non-disclosure of prior inter­est of Indian rights includ­ing land]. If another per­son [third-party pur­chasers] then falls into peril because of this haz­ardous sit­u­a­tion, the cre­ator [Canada] of the haz­ard – who may not nec­es­sar­ily have been a neg­li­gent tort­fea­sor – has a duty to res­cue the indi­vid­ual [third-party pur­chasers] in peril We can now address the fal­lacy of Jus­tice Arrells state­ment, The city of Brant­ford, a non-crown cor­po­ra­tion is also “third-party pur­chaser”, how­ever in Brant­ford &Co’s. case they are also del­e­gated rep­re­sen­ta­tives for the cit­i­zens of Brant­ford iden­ti­fied as the inno­cent third-party pur­chasers. Since Brant­ford is agent for the Cit­i­zens as prin­ci­pals, the oblig­a­tion to inform the cit­i­zen is the duty of their agent, not the duty of the pri­vate Indian, Jus­tice Arrell state­ment is in this writ­ers opin­ion that was bla­tant exam­ple of con­ver­sion of risk and omis­sion of Agent “Brant­ford” duty and lia­bil­i­ties, due to the fact that the state­ment redi­rects the source of risk from the Agents “Brant­ford” to the pri­vate Indian, thus Brant­ford cre­ated the risk by not inform­ing the cit­i­zens of active and prior pri­vate Indian rights includ­ing the land.

In this con­text, con­ver­sion of con­sti­tu­tional or pri­vate rights hap­pens when juris­dic­tion of the pri­vate Indian is granted to the court, either, when a pri­vate Indian hires a for­eign lawyer or silenced, he may then be pre­sumed to have Cana­dian con­sti­tu­tional rep­re­sen­ta­tion and thus declared a Cana­dian cit­i­zen [aka killing the Indian and sav­ing the man], the court then has jurisdiction.

How­ever when the pri­vate Indian rebukes and cor­rects any bogus pre­sump­tion he then remains pri­vate and “off the records” and con­ver­sion of law has not manifested.

There­fore it is con­tended that no Cana­dian domes­tic court has the juris­dic­tion to deter­mine legit­i­macy of any cases brought before its bench con­cern­ing the pri­vate Indian, appli­ca­tion of canadas con­sti­tu­tion must be will­fully cho­sen by the indi­vid­ual pri­vate Indian [evi­den­tiary autho­rized by the pri­vate Indian], when appli­ca­tion is forced, by coer­cion, mis­rep­re­sen­ta­tion or duress, this can only equate with tyranny “ultra vires” and repres­sion of the Indian right to exist, also observed as con­sti­tu­tional van­dal­ism, trea­son, mis­rep­re­sen­ta­tion, con­ti­nen­tal and spir­i­tual war­fare, abduc­tion, hid­den enslave­ment and influ­ence of the mind.

Our right to exist—have you ever heard of such a thing? Would it enter the mind of any Briton or French­man, Bel­gian or Dutch­man, Hun­gar­ian or Bul­gar­ian, Russ­ian or Amer­i­can, to request for its peo­ple recog­ni­tion of its right to exist?, our very exis­tence per se is our right to exist.

1791 Thomas Paine, Rights of Man: “The fact there­fore must be that the indi­vid­u­als them­selves, each in his own per­sonal and sov­er­eign right, entered into a con­tract with each oth­erto pro­duce a gov­ern­ment: and this is the only mode in which gov­ern­ments have a right to arise, and the only prin­ci­ple on which they have a right to exist.

1882 Ernest Renan, “What is a nation?”: So long as this moral con­scious­ness gives proof of its strength by the sac­ri­fices which demand the abdi­ca­tion of the indi­vid­ual to the advan­tage of the com­mu­nity, it is legit­i­mate and has the right to exist [French: le droit d’exister].

1922 Cemal Pasa: “In a word, the [Young Turks] want to make the Turk­ish race respected in the eyes of the world and secure its right to exist side by side with the other nations in the twen­ti­eth century.”

2009 Barack Obama: “Israelis must acknowl­edge that just as Israel’s right to exist can­not be
denied, nei­ther can Palestine’s.

Tyranny, is usu­ally thought of as cruel and oppres­sive, and it often is, but the orig­i­nal def­i­n­i­tion of the term was rule by per­sons who lack legit­i­macy, whether they be malign or benev­o­lent. His­tor­i­cally, benign tyran­nies have tended to be inse­cure, and to try to main­tain their power by becom­ing increas­ingly oppressive.

There­fore, rule that ini­tially seems benign is inher­ently dan­ger­ous, and the only secu­rity is to main­tain legit­i­macy — an unbro­ken account­abil­ity to the peo­ple through the frame­work of a writ­ten con­sti­tu­tion that pro­vides for elec­tion of key offi­cials and the divi­sion of pow­ers among branches and offi­cials in a way that avoids con­cen­tra­tion of pow­ers in the hands of a few per­sons who might then abuse those powers.

Tyranny is an impor­tant phe­nom­e­non that oper­ates by prin­ci­ples by which it can be rec­og­nized in its early emerg­ing stages, and, if the peo­ple are vig­i­lant, pre­pared, and com­mit­ted to lib­erty, coun­tered before it becomes entrenched.
The ideal tyranny is that which is igno­rantly self-administered by its vic­tims. The most per­fect
slaves are, there­fore, those which bliss­fully and unawaredly enslave them­selves.
–Dres­den James

Of all tyran­nies, a tyranny exer­cised for the good of its vic­tims may be the most oppres­sive. It
may be bet­ter to live under rob­ber barons than under omnipo­tent moral busy­bod­ies. The rob­ber
baron’s cru­elty may some­times sleep, his cupid­ity may at some point be sati­ated; but those who
tor­ment us for our own good will tor­ment us with­out end, for they do so with the approval of their
con­sciences.“
– C. S. Lewis

The psy­chol­ogy of tyranny

Per­haps one of the things that most dis­tin­guishes those with a fas­cist men­tal­ity from most other per­sons is how they react in sit­u­a­tions that engen­der feel­ings of inse­cu­rity and inad­e­quacy. Both kinds of peo­ple will tend to seek to increase their power, that is, their con­trol over the out­come of events, but those with a fas­cist mind­set tend to over­es­ti­mate the amount of influ­ence over out­comes that it is pos­si­ble to attain.

This leads to behav­ior that often brings them to posi­tions of lead­er­ship or author­ity, espe­cially if most other per­sons in their soci­ety tend to under­es­ti­mate the influ­ence over out­comes they can attain, and are inclined to yield to those who project con­fi­dence in what they can do and promise more than any­one can deliver

This process is aided by a com­mon sus­cep­ti­bil­ity which might be called the rooster syn­drome, from the old say­ing, “They give credit to the rooster crow­ing for the ris­ing of the sun.” It arises from the ten­dency of peo­ple guided more by hope or fear than intel­li­gence to over­es­ti­mate the power of their lead­ers and attribute to them out­comes, either good or bad, to which the lead­ers con­tributed lit­tle if any­thing, and per­haps even acted to pre­vent or reduce. This comes from the inabil­ity of most per­sons to under­stand com­plex dynamic sys­tems and their long-term behav­ior, which leads peo­ple to attribute effects to prox­i­mate pre­ced­ing events instead of actual long-term causes.

The emer­gence of tyranny there­fore begins with chal­lenges to a group, devel­ops into gen­eral feel­ings of inse­cu­rity and inad­e­quacy, and falls into a pat­tern in which some indi­vid­u­als assume the role of “father” to the oth­ers, who will­ingly sub­mit to becom­ing depen­dent “chil­dren” of such per­sons if only they are reas­sured that a more favor­able out­come will be realized.

This pat­tern of co-dependency is patho­log­i­cal, and gen­er­ally results in deci­sion mak­ing of poor qual­ity that makes the sit­u­a­tion even worse, but, because the pat­tern is patho­log­i­cal, instead of aban­don­ing it, the co-dependents repeat their inap­pro­pri­ate behav­ior to pro­duce a vicious spi­ral that, if not inter­rupted, can lead to total break­down of the group and the worst of the avail­able outcomes.

In psy­chi­a­try, this syn­drome is often dis­cussed as an “author­i­tar­ian per­son­al­ity dis­or­der”. In com­mon par­lance, as being a “con­trol freak”.

The logic of tyranny

In Orwell’s clas­sic fable, Nine­teen Eighty-Four, the pro­tag­o­nist Win­ston Smith makes a key state­ment:
Free­dom is the free­dom to say that two plus two make four. If that is granted, all else follows.

Fol­low­ing the trial of the sur­viv­ing Branch David­i­ans in San Anto­nio, Texas, in March, 1994, in which a misin­structed jury acquit­ted all the defen­dants of the main crimes with which they were charged, but con­victed them of the enhance­ments of using firearms in the com­mis­sion of a crime, the fed­eral judge, Wal­ter F. Smith, first dis­missed the charges, cor­rectly, on the grounds that it is log­i­cally impos­si­ble to be guilty of an enhance­ment if one is inno­cent of the crime.

How­ever, under appar­ent polit­i­cal pres­sure, he sub­se­quently reversed his own rul­ing and sen­tenced the defen­dants to max­i­mum terms as though they had been con­victed of the main crimes, offer­ing the com­ment, “The law doesn’t have to be logical.”

No. The law does have to be log­i­cal. Oth­er­wise it is not law. It is arbi­trary rule by force.

Now by “log­i­cal” what is meant is two-valued logic, which is some­times also called Boolean, Aris­totelian or Euclid­ean logic. In other words, a sys­tem of propo­si­tions within which a state­ment and its nega­tion can­not both be true or valid. One of the two must befalse or invalid. The two pos­si­ble val­ues are true and false, and every mean­ing­ful propo­si­tion can be assigned one or the other value.

A sys­tem of law is a body of pre­scrip­tive, as opposed to descrip­tive, propo­si­tions, that sup­port the mak­ing of deci­sions, and there­fore its logic must be two-valued. It is a fun­da­men­tal prin­ci­ple of law that like cases must be decided alike, and this means accord­ing to propo­si­tions that exclude their con­tra­dic­tions. It is also a fun­da­men­tal prin­ci­ple of logic that any sys­tem of propo­si­tions that accepts both a state­ment and its nega­tion as valid, that is, which accepts a con­tra­dic­tion, accepts all con­tra­dic­tions, and pro­vides no basis for decid­ing among them.

If deci­sions are made, they are not made on the basis of the propo­si­tions, but are arbi­trary, and that is the def­i­n­i­tion of the rule of men, as opposed to the rule of law.

So what Win­ston Smith is say­ing is that free­dom means being able to dis­tin­guish between a true propo­si­tion and a false one, and what his neme­sis O’Brien there­fore does to crush him is make him accept that “2 + 2 = 5″, which can­not be true if the logic is Aris­totelian. O’Brien rep­re­sents the logic of arbi­trary power, a “logic” we might call Orwellian, although Orwell, whose real name was Eric Blair, was strongly opposed to it.

The method­ol­ogy of tyranny

The meth­ods used to over­throw a con­sti­tu­tional order and estab­lish a tyranny are well-known. How­ever, despite this aware­ness, it is sur­pris­ing how those who have no inten­tion of per­pe­trat­ing a tyranny can slip into these meth­ods and bring about a tyranny despite their best inten­tions. Tyranny does not have to be delib­er­ate. Tyrants can fool them­selves as thor­oughly as they fool every­one else.

Con­trol of pub­lic infor­ma­tion and opinion

It begins with with­hold­ing infor­ma­tion, and leads to putting out false or mis­lead­ing infor­ma­tion. A gov­ern­ment can develop min­istries of pro­pa­ganda under many guises. They typ­i­cally call it “pub­lic infor­ma­tion” or “marketing”.

Vote fraud used to pre­vent the elec­tion of reformers

It doesn’t mat­ter which of the two major party can­di­dates are elected if no real reformer can get nom­i­nated, and when news ser­vices start know­ing the out­comes of elec­tions before it is pos­si­ble for them to know, then the votes are not being hon­estly counted.

Undue offi­cial influ­ence on tri­als and juries

Non-random selec­tion of jury pan­els, exclu­sion of those opposed to the law, exclu­sion of the jury from hear­ing argu­ment on the law, exclu­sion of pri­vate pros­e­cu­tors from access to the grand jury, and pre­ven­tion of par­ties and their coun­sels from mak­ing effec­tive argu­ments or chal­leng­ing the government.

Usurpa­tion of undel­e­gated powers

This is usu­ally done with pop­u­lar sup­port for solv­ing some prob­lem, or to redis­trib­ute wealth to the advan­tage of the sup­port­ers of the dom­i­nant fac­tion, but it soon leads to the depri­va­tion of rights of minori­ties and individuals.

Seek­ing a gov­ern­ment monop­oly on the capa­bil­ity and use of armed force

The first signs are efforts to reg­is­ter or restrict the pos­ses­sion and use of firearms, ini­tially under the guise of “pro­tect­ing” the pub­lic, which, when it actu­ally results in increased crime, pro­vides a basis for fur­ther dis­ar­ma­ment efforts affect­ing more peo­ple and more weapons.

Mil­i­ta­riza­tion of law enforcement

Declar­ing a “war on crime” that becomes a war on civil lib­er­ties. Prepa­ra­tion of mil­i­tary forces for inter­nal polic­ing duties.

Infil­tra­tion and sub­ver­sion of cit­i­zen groups that could be forces for reform

Inter­nal spy­ing and sur­veil­lance is the begin­ning. A sign is false pros­e­cu­tions of their leaders.

Sup­pres­sion of inves­ti­ga­tors and whistleblowers

When peo­ple who try to uncover high level wrong­do­ing are threat­ened, that is a sign the sys­tem is not only rid­dled with cor­rup­tion, but that the cor­rup­tion has passed the thresh­old into active tyranny.

Use of the law for com­pe­ti­tion suppression

It begins with the dom­i­nant fac­tion win­ning sup­port by pay­ing off their sup­port­ers and sup­press­ing their sup­port­ers’ com­peti­tors, but leads to pub­lic offi­cials them­selves engag­ing in ille­gal activ­i­ties and using the law to sup­press inde­pen­dent com­peti­tors. A good exam­ple of this is nar­cotics trafficking.

Sub­ver­sion of inter­nal checks and balances

This involves the appoint­ment to key posi­tions of per­sons who can be con­trolled by their spon­sors, and who are then induced to do ille­gal things. The worst way in which this occurs is in the appoint­ment of judges that will go along with uncon­sti­tu­tional acts by the other branches.

Cre­ation of a class of offi­cials who are above the law

This is indi­cated by dis­missal of charges for wrong­do­ing against per­sons who are “fol­low­ing orders”.
Increas­ing depen­dency of the peo­ple on government

The clas­sic approach to dom­i­na­tion of the peo­ple is to first take every­thing they have away from them, then make them com­pli­ant with the demands of the rulers to get any­thing back again.

Increas­ing pub­lic igno­rance of their civic duties and reluc­tance to per­form them

When the peo­ple avoid doing things like vot­ing and serv­ing in mili­tias and juries, tyranny is not far behind.

Use of staged events to pro­duce pop­u­lar support

Acts of ter­ror­ism, blamed on polit­i­cal oppo­nents, fol­lowed imme­di­ately with well-prepared pro­pos­als for increased pow­ers and bud­gets for sup­pres­sive agen­cies. Some­times called a Reich­stag plot.

Con­ver­sion of rights into privileges

Requir­ing licenses and per­mits for doing things that the gov­ern­ment does not have the del­e­gated power to restrict, except by due process in which the bur­den of proof is on the petitioner.

Polit­i­cal correctness

Many if not most peo­ple are sus­cep­ti­ble to being recruited to engage in repres­sive actions against dis­fa­vored views or behav­iors, and led to pave the way for the dom­i­nance of tyran­ni­cal government.

Avoid­ing tyranny

The key is always to detect ten­den­cies toward tyranny and sup­press them before they go too far or become too firmly estab­lished. The peo­ple must never acqui­esce in any vio­la­tion of the pri­vate Con­sti­tu­tion. Fail­ure to take cor­rec­tive action early will only mean that more severe mea­sures will have to be taken later, per­haps with the loss of life and the dis­rup­tion of the soci­ety in ways from which recov­ery may take centuries.

Gov­ern­ment can­not force a free will pri­vate Indian to be a cor­po­rate mem­ber, even though they use decep­tion to entrap peo­ple into the sta­tus of “Cana­dian Sta­tus Indian”, “ Band Indian” the pri­vate Indian has a duty to defend against and dis­obey all forms of tyranny through right of self defence, the right of neces­sity and claim of right “with law­ful excuse” to guard against any breach of the peace and abuse of the Indian-Canadian guest-friend rela­tion­ship.
Dis­obey­ing a statute, In Cana­dian Law; solely observed by the pri­vate Indian; for intel­li­gence only. Sec. 126 (1) Every one who, with­out law­ful excuse, con­tra­venes an Act of Par­lia­ment by wil­fully doing any­thing that it for­bids or by wil­fully omit­ting to do any­thing that it requires to be done is, unless a pun­ish­ment is expressly pro­vided by law, guilty of an indictable offence and liable to impris­on­ment for a term not exceed­ing two years. R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 126; R.S., 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.), s. 185(F). Dis­obey­ing order of court

Sec. 127. (1) Every one who, with­out law­ful excuse, dis­obeys a law­ful order made by a court of jus­tice or by a per­son or body of per­sons autho­rized by any Act to make or give the order, other than an order for the pay­ment of money, is, unless a pun­ish­ment or other mode of pro­ceed­ing is expressly pro­vided by law, guilty of (a) an indictable offence and liable to impris­on­ment for a term not exceed­ing two years; or (b) an offence pun­ish­able on sum­mary conviction.

This then explains the use of Sec­tion 39 of the Crim­i­nal Code of Canada which says: “Defence with claim of right”

(1) Every one who is in peace­able pos­ses­sion of per­sonal prop­erty under a claim of right, and every one act­ing under his author­ity, is pro­tected from crim­i­nal respon­si­bil­ity for defend­ing that pos­ses­sion, even against a per­son enti­tled by law to pos­ses­sion of it, if he uses no more force than is nec­es­sary. Defence ‘with­out’ claim of right
(2) Every one who is in peace­able pos­ses­sion of per­sonal prop­erty, but does not claim it as of right or does not act under the author­ity of a per­son who claims it as of right, is not jus­ti­fied or pro­tected from crim­i­nal respon­si­bil­ity for defend­ing his pos­ses­sion against a per­son who is enti­tled by law to pos­ses­sion of it. R.S., c. C-34, s. 39.

This also sug­gests that there are no true ‘judi­cial’ courts for the ‘free will peo­ple’ of Canada not only the pri­vate Indian. All courts are “admin­is­tra­tive” for “law­ful slave admin­is­tra­tion and slave dis­ci­plin­ing’ in the admin­is­tra­tive courts of the cor­po­rate Crown, the admin­is­tra­tive body of the City of London.

This means that the sum­mons or arrest war­rant and trial are by the claimed prop­erty rights of the Crown. And, the accused dis­obe­di­ent slave can be, and usu­ally is stripped of all rights of due process by way of the doc­trine of ‘homo sacer’ (non-person or out-law) out of the Roman Law sys­tem, or in the instance of the pri­vate Indian through con­ver­sion of his pri­vate rights.

Inter­est­ingly, the Crim­i­nal Code of Canada, a Roman civil law doc­u­ment pre­tain­ing only to the com­mer­cial cor­po­ra­tion called the Crown in right of Canada or of a province, but reflect­ing much of the Anglo-Saxon Com­mon Law rel­a­tive to torts [wrongs against peo­ple or against their unalien­able rights]. Unfor­tu­nately, tort law is used against free will indi­vid­ual men by a claim within the claimed to exist prop­erty right by the cor­po­rate Crown — the claim of a slave owner to admin­is­ter and dis­ci­pline its slave property.

The ques­tion has to be asked is “How much force is nec­es­sary to defend prop­erty or one­self from unlaw­ful arrest or con­fis­ca­tion of pos­ses­sions by police offi­cers car­ry­ing loaded firearms and who are also trained in mar­tial arts, and will fre­quently, and with­out hes­i­ta­tion, use both?” Fur­ther, Sec­tion 41(1) of the CCC states:
In Defense of a House

Every one who is in peace­able pos­ses­sion of a dwelling-house or real prop­erty and every­one law­fully assist­ing him or act­ing under his author­ity is jus­ti­fied in using force to pre­vent any per­son from tres­pass­ing on the dwelling-house or real prop­erty, or to remove a tres­passer there­from, if he uses no more force than is necessary.

But, even more impor­tant in these days of fore­clo­sures on homes

42. (1) Every one is jus­ti­fied in peace­ably enter­ing a dwelling-house or real prop­erty by day to take pos­ses­sion of it if he, or a per­son under whose author­ity he acts, is law­fully enti­tled to pos­ses­sion of it.
Assault in case of law­ful entry
(2) Where a per­son
(a) not hav­ing peace­able pos­ses­sion of a dwelling-house or real prop­erty under a claim of right, or
(b) not act­ing under the author­ity of a per­son who has peace­able pos­ses­sion of a dwelling-house or real prop­erty under a claim of right,
assaults a per­son who is law­fully enti­tled to pos­ses­sion of it and who is enter­ing it peace­ably by day to take pos­ses­sion of it, for the pur­pose of pre­vent­ing him from enter­ing, the assault shall be deemed to be with­out jus­ti­fi­ca­tion or provo­ca­tion.
Note: But, with claim of right, it is jus­ti­fi­able.
Tres­passer pro­vok­ing assault
(3)Where a per­son
(a) hav­ing peace­able pos­ses­sion of a dwelling-house or real prop­erty under a claim of right, or
(b) act­ing under the author­ity of a per­son who has peace­able pos­ses­sion of a dwelling-house or real prop­erty under a claim of right, assaults any per­son who is law­fully enti­tled to pos­ses­sion of it and who is enter­ing it peace­ably by day to take pos­ses­sion of it, for the pur­pose of pre­vent­ing him from enter­ing, the assault shall be deemed to be pro­voked by the per­son who is entering.

Note: This takes care­ful read­ing, as the lan­guage is con­vo­luted to con­fuse the unwary. If one has a claim of right, which would pri­mar­ily be an ‘claim in equity’ — the one who has given it value, a ‘legal claimant’ has no right to enter or claim the prop­erty. They can be stopped by the force nec­es­sary, and if the legal claimant is accom­pa­nied by an armed offi­cer, then lethal force can be used, as the offi­cer will use the force of arms against you, or call for help to over­come you.

As is com­monly the occur­rence, police invade homes and real prop­erty with­out proper, or no war­rants when there is no emer­gency rea­son mutual agree­ment to do so.

Remem­ber these points of law when the police invade a home to seize guns, held peace­ably, or such things as com­put­ers, and papers:

An arrest or search made with a:-
defec­tive war­rant;
or, issued with­out affi­davit;
or, fails to allege a crime
or, is with­out juris­dic­tion
…is a crim­i­nal act by police, sub­ject to the right of self defense.

Any offi­cer of the gov­ern­ment, such as a judge, a jus­tice of the peace(JP), a clerk of the court, a Crown coun­cil, police, and other agents of the Crown, includ­ing Canada Cus­toms and Rev­enue agents, who unlaw­fully deprive you of your Orig­i­nal right as Pri­vate Indi­ans, are depriv­ing you of your LIFE.

They claim that right of admin­is­tra­tion over you by the false and fraud­u­lent claim upon you as a con­cocted legal fic­tion attached to your Cre­ated body — the name found on the copy of the birth cer­tifi­cate you may have in your pos­ses­sion where the fam­ily name has been con­verted into a pri­mary name or sur­name. This is an evil game of play-acting as make-believe offi­cers of a make-believe ship called a Roman style cor­po­ra­tion — the Crown, upon which you are assumed to be a lowly crewmember.

Their game is totally make-believe — a fan­tasy; how­ever, the results of their dispi­ca­ble games are very real to you in the depri­va­tion of your Orig­i­nal RIGHTS, espe­cially your LIFE. Remem­ber, LIFE is TIME. We have a lim­ited amount of time to spend on this planet, and gov­ern­ment thugs have no claim on any of it, be it any time out of your phys­i­cal pres­ence, or your time spent earn­ing a liv­ing wage.

And so, where there is no avail­able jus­tice sys­tem, or where the jus­tice sys­tem is actu­ally per­pe­trat­ing the crime against you, you have a right to use deadly force on the per­pe­tra­tor, or upon those who have usurped author­ity to direct deadly force against you, and have a his­tory of doing so, as is the case with judges, JP’s and CCRA agents act­ing unlaw­fully under the assump­tion that you are a “lim­ited lia­bil­ity per­son” — a servant/subject of the Crown and not the Peace­ful, Strong and Right­eous Pri­vate Indian.

There is absolutely no excuse for a judge or JP being igno­rant of the Magna Carta, espe­cially Sec­tion 39, and, there are many recent acknowl­edg­ments by Cana­dian courts that the Magna Carta is a viable part of the Cana­dian Con­sti­tu­tion (and, not in ref­er­ence to the Trudeau Con­sti­tu­tion Act 1982):

39. No free­man shall be taken, or impris­oned, or dis­seized, or out­lawed, or exiled, or in any way harmed–nor will we go upon or send upon him–save by the law­ful judg­ment of his peers or by the law of the land.

All judges and jp’s know that you as a pri­vate Indian are not sub­ject to income tax or any admin­is­tra­tive pro­ce­dures aris­ing out of the Cana­dian con­sti­tu­tion where the com­plaint is rel­a­tive to your not com­ply­ing with the “the rule of law“. They have absolutely no excuse for such unlaw­ful activity.

Con­sider a judge or jp who issues an arrest war­rant against you for your fail­ure to appear for a sum­mons on an income tax issue. They have unlaw­fully sent armed men (police or sher­iff) who will kill or severely injure you if you resist arrest. There­fore, they are just as guilty of tak­ing your life as would be the police­man or sher­iff who attempts to arrest you for such a falsely issued warrant.

Any CRA agent who comes to your door to serve notices and demands upon you KNOW that you are not sub­ject to their admin­is­tra­tive pro­ce­dures. They use such vis­i­ta­tions to “pro­duce evi­dence” that you some­how give assent to being a “per­son” sub­ject to the income tax act. This is fraud for the pur­poses of tak­ing that part of your life that makes up the wages they wish to deprive you of as income tax. Do you have a right to take their life? You bet! They have the gov­ern­ment jus­tice sys­tem sup­port­ing their fraud and extor­tion game — and the intent to take your life.

Lord Black­stone says that the fifth aux­il­iary right is the use of arms where no jus­tice sys­tem will defend your rights. The first four aux­il­iary rights are the forms of redress where some level of gov­ern­ment will inter­cede for you. Canada is com­pletely devoid of these first four rel­a­tive to income tax and the activ­i­ties of CRA

Sim­ply, what this means that if a judge con­victs you of income tax eva­sion, fail­ure to file, or other charge out of the income tax act or other, he/she is tak­ing your life. If the judge or JP does other than to ask you if you have made a con­tract with the Crown to be a cor­po­rate part of the Crown as a lim­ited lia­bil­ity entity, unless such a writ­ten and signed con­tract between you and an agent of the Crown is part of the affi­davit that issued with the sum­mons or war­rant, that judge or JP is com­mit­ting high trea­son against you, the sov­er­eign. And if your answer is “NO!”, the judge or JP has no other choice than to imme­di­ately quash the issue, and issue rep­ri­mand against the CRA agent(s) and Crown Coun­cil who caused the charge to be issued, thus rec­og­niz­ing the pri­vacy of the Indian nations and national members.

The RIGHT OF SELF DEFENCE, espe­cially against tyranny per­pe­trated by those who rep­re­sent offi­cers of the gov­ern­ment, is based upon the Anglo-Saxon Com­mon Law Prin­ci­ple called the “Rule of NECESSITY”. The ulti­mate “rule of Neces­sity” is the right to kill to pro­tect your own life.

This fact could eas­ily be mit­i­gated by the Cana­dian Judi­ciary mak­ing a pub­lic dec­la­ra­tion that they will uphold their oaths to the Queen, and to pro­tect the RIGHTS of Cana­dian “Cit­i­zens”, includ­ing the right to not sub­mit to the gov­ern­ment extor­tion racket called the Income Tax and GST.

The RULE of NECESSITY, when we hear the expres­sion ‘Rule of Neces­sity’, we usu­ally think ‘Self Defense’, where an action, includ­ing deadly force, is the only avail­able option to defend one’s, or another’s, phys­i­cal body from impend­ing harm by a belig­er­ant assault­ing party. But. it is also a claim to be dealt with in a hear­ing of juris­dic­tion by courts, before a court can pro­ceed to try a party who has used an action for self defense, and was charged with a crime for doing so.

In such a case, the onus is on the Crown or State to prove that the party com­mit­ted the act vol­un­tar­ily, and not under duress, that other options of defense or actions were avail­able, and that there was ‘mens rea’ — crim­i­nal intent by the accused party. Remem­ber, evi­dence ‘sug­gests’, proof ‘shows’.

How­ever, as a slave owned by the Crown or State, if you accept or acknowl­edge that you are ‘one and the same’ as the ‘legal iden­tity’ — as the name shown on a birth cer­tifi­cate, you have no right of defense against the ‘offi­cers’ of the slave owner, the Crown or State. The above Amer­i­can cases were decided when the State was con­ceal­ing the fact that cit­i­zens were con­sid­ered slaves, and now have States pros­e­cut­ing those who defend them­selves by using force against police com­mit­ting unlaw­ful actions against them.

It now seems that the veil of deceit has been removed by one’s observion of recent State’s (or Crown’s) orders to use what­ever force is desir­able or nec­es­sary to dis­ci­pline or even exter­mi­nate dis­obe­di­ent slaves, as all ‘per­sons’ were declared ‘dis­obe­di­ent slaves’ in the early 1930s. All statutes, includ­ing Police Acts, deal only with ‘per­sons’ — peo­ple in the role of ‘slave’, and police in the role of slave dis­ci­pline and the enforce­ment of slave owner’s rules. Police have no author­ity over ‘free will adult humans, except as ‘posse comi­ta­tus’ — men of the county, the same author­ity as any other moral adult human has oblig­a­tions to defend peo­ple and prop­erty from mali­cious theft, threat or damage.

Clar­i­fi­ca­tion: The State or Crown takes the given and fam­ily name, reg­is­tered by the par­ents of a new­born child, and con­verts the fam­ily name into a ‘sur­name’ [pri­mary name], and con­verts the given names to ‘ref­er­en­tial names’, this is oppo­site to real­ity, and is thus a fic­tion. How­ever, upon doing that, the State or Crown claims the name under copy­right as cre­ated intel­lec­tual prop­erty. When that child becomes an adult, the State or Crown assumes [by their use of false and fraud­u­lent edu­ca­tion to deceive peo­ple into believ­ing that the ‘legal iden­tity name’ is their name] that that human has enveloped him/herself in that name, the name as found on the birth cer­tifi­cate. How­ever, there are vague clauses in statutes deal­ing with names, name changes and/or vital sta­tis­tics which shows that is ‘offered’ as a con­tract, and thus need not be accepted by the adult human. To ‘offer’ in con­tract means that the ‘offerer’ owns that which is being offered. Of course, any con­tract is void if not ‘accepted’ know­ingly and voluntarily.

The accep­tance of that ‘legal iden­tity’ name car­ries with it the sta­tus of ‘slave’ owned by the State or Crown. The State/Crown applies the legal maxim: acces­sio cedit prin­ci­pali — an acces­sory [the human free will adult you] attached to a prin­ci­pal [the legal iden­tity name] becomes the prop­erty of the owner [State/Crown] of the principal.

Recent research shows that the actual accep­tance of the Crown or State owned ‘legal iden­tity’ name is vol­un­tary, and thus, you don’t have to acknowl­edge or accept that name. But, we do have to use that name in com­merce, bank­ing, obtain­ing a pass­port, and deal­ing with gov­ern­ment and other cor­po­rate bod­ies. And, the key term here is ‘have to’ — no choice, not a vol­un­tary issue. The “have to’s” is that which our lives depend — food, shel­ter, cloth­ing, eco­nom­ics, travel, and so forth. There­fore, the use of the legal iden­tity in col­lect­ing our wages, bank­ing, in gov­ern­ment pro­grams, driver’s license, etc. is not really a vol­un­tary issue.

IF it is not used in a vol­un­tary way, it is under ‘PRIVATE NECESSITY’, a ver­sion of the Rule of Neces­sity. Under that rule, no con­tract is implied or can be assumed by the Crown or State — unless we remain silent regard­ing our claim of Pri­vate Necessity.

What is sug­gested that any one that can see what is your rem­edy in a sys­tem of no such thing, you will have to decide what ship you want to be on, the colo­nial ves­sel or get build­ing the raft and make your way home.

The RIGHT OF REBELLION, In polit­i­cal phi­los­o­phy, the right of rev­o­lu­tion (or right of rebel­lion) is the right or duty, var­i­ously stated through­out his­tory, of the peo­ple of a nation to over­throw a gov­ern­ment that acts against their com­mon inter­ests. Belief in this right extends back to ancient China, and it has been used through­out his­tory to jus­tify var­i­ous rebel­lions, includ­ing the Amer­i­can Rev­o­lu­tion and the­French Rev­o­lu­tion.
The RIGHT OF REVOLUTION AS AN INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE RIGHT

Although some expla­na­tions of the right of rev­o­lu­tion leave open the pos­si­bil­ity of its exer­cise as an indi­vid­ual right, it was clearly under­stood to be col­lec­tive right under Eng­lish con­sti­tu­tional and polit­i­cal theory.

As Pauline Maier has noted in her study From Resis­tance to Rev­o­lu­tion, “[p]rivate indi­vid­u­als were for­bid­den to take force against their rulers either for mal­ice or because of pri­vate injuries.…” Instead, “not just a few indi­vid­u­als, but the ‘Body of the Peo­ple’ had to feel con­cerned” before the right of rev­o­lu­tion was jus­ti­fied and with most writ­ers speak­ing of a “ ‘whole peo­ple who are the Pub­lick,’ or the body of the peo­ple act­ing in their ‘pub­lic Author­ity,’ indi­cat­ing a broad con­sen­sus involv­ing all ranks of society.”

The con­cept of the right of rev­o­lu­tion was also taken up by John Locke in Two Trea­tises of Gov­ern­ment as part of his social con­tract the­ory. Locke declared that under nat­ural law, allpeo­ple have the right to life, lib­erty, and estate; under the social con­tract, the peo­ple could insti­gate a rev­o­lu­tion against the gov­ern­ment when it acted against the inter­ests of cit­i­zens, to replace the gov­ern­ment with one that served the inter­ests of citizens.

In some cases, Locke deemed rev­o­lu­tion an oblig­a­tion. The right of rev­o­lu­tion thus essen­tially acted as a safe­guard against tyranny.

Duty ver­sus right

Some philoso­phers argue that it is not only the right of a peo­ple to over­throw an oppres­sive gov­ern­ment but also their duty to do so. Howard Evans Kiefer opines, “It seems to me that the duty to rebel is much more under­stand­able than that right to rebel, because the right to rebel­lion ruins the order of power, whereas the duty to rebel goes beyond and breaks it.”

Mor­ton White writes of the Amer­i­can rev­o­lu­tion­ar­ies, “The notion that they had a duty to rebel is extremely impor­tant to stress, for it shows that they thought they were com­ply­ing with the com­mands of nat­ural law and of nature’s God when they threw off absolute despotism.”

The U.S. Dec­la­ra­tion of Inde­pen­dence states that “when a long train of abuses and usurpa­tions, pur­su­ing invari­ably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despo­tism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Gov­ern­ment” (empha­sis added). Mar­tin Luther King like­wise held that it is the duty of the peo­ple to resist unjust laws.

Some the­o­ries of the right of rev­o­lu­tion imposed sig­nif­i­cant pre­con­di­tions on its exer­cise, lim­it­ing its invo­ca­tion to the most dire cir­cum­stances. In the Amer­i­can Rev­o­lu­tion­ary con­text, one finds expres­sions of the right of rev­o­lu­tion both as sub­ject to pre­con­di­tion and as unre­strained by con­di­tions. On the eve of the Amer­i­can Rev­o­lu­tion, for exam­ple, Amer­i­cans con­sid­ered their plight to jus­tify exer­cise of the right of revolution.

Alexan­der Hamil­ton jus­ti­fied Amer­i­can resis­tance as an expres­sion of “the law of nature” redress­ing vio­la­tions of “the first prin­ci­ples of civil soci­ety” and inva­sions of “the rights of a whole peo­ple.” For Thomas Jef­fer­son the Dec­la­ra­tion was the last-ditch effort of an oppressed peo­ple— the posi­tion many Amer­i­cans saw them­selves in 1776. Jefferson’s litany of colo­nial griev­ances was an effort to estab­lish that Amer­i­cans met their bur­den to exer­cise the nat­ural law right of revolution.

Nat­ural law or pos­i­tive law

Descrip­tions of the Right of Rev­o­lu­tion also dif­fer in whether that right is con­sid­ered to be a nat­ural law (a law whose con­tent is set by nature and that there­fore has valid­ity every­where) or pos­i­tive law (law enacted or adopted by proper author­ity for gov­ern­ing of the state).

An exam­ple of the dual nature of the right of rev­o­lu­tion as both a nat­ural law and as pos­i­tive law is found in the Amer­i­can rev­o­lu­tion­ary con­text. Although the Amer­i­can Dec­la­ra­tion of Inde­pen­dence invoked the nat­ural law right of rev­o­lu­tion, nat­ural law was not the sole jus­ti­fi­ca­tion for Amer­i­can inde­pen­dence. Eng­lish con­sti­tu­tional doc­trine also sup­ported the colonists’ actions. By the 1760s, Eng­lish law rec­og­nized what William Blackstone’s Com­men­taries on the Laws of Eng­land called “the law of redress against pub­lic oppres­sion.” Like the nat­ural law’s right of rev­o­lu­tion, this con­sti­tu­tional law of redress jus­ti­fied the peo­ple resist­ing the sovereign.

This law of redress arose from a con­tract between the peo­ple and the king to pre­serve the pub­lic wel­fare. This orig­i­nal con­tract was “a cen­tral dogma in Eng­lish and British con­sti­tu­tional law” since “time immemo­r­ial.” The Declaration’s long list of griev­ances demon­strated that this bar­gain had been breached.

This well-accepted law of redress jus­ti­fied a peo­ple resist­ing uncon­sti­tu­tional acts of gov­ern­ment. Lib­erty depended upon the people’s “ulti­mate” right to resist. Uncon­sti­tu­tional com­mands breach­ing the “vol­un­tary com­pact between the rulers and the ruled” could be “ignored” and arbi­trary com­mands opposed with force. This right implied a duty on the part of the peo­ple to resist uncon­sti­tu­tional acts. As Alexan­der Hamil­ton noted in 1775, gov­ern­ment exer­cised pow­ers to pro­tect “the absolute rights” of the peo­ple and gov­ern­ment for­feited those pow­ers and the peo­ple could reclaim them if gov­ern­ment breached this con­sti­tu­tional contract.

The law of redress had lim­its like the right of rev­o­lu­tion under nat­ural law. The law of redress, like the right of rev­o­lu­tion, was not an indi­vid­ual right. It belonged to the com­mu­nity as a whole, as one of the par­ties to the orig­i­nal con­sti­tu­tional con­tract. It was not a means of first resort, or response to triv­ial or casual errors of gov­ern­ment. Blackstone’s Com­men­taries sug­gested that using the law of redress would be “extra­or­di­nary,” for exam­ple if the king broke the orig­i­nal con­tract, vio­lated “the fun­da­men­tal laws,” or aban­doned the kingdom.

Dur­ing the Stamp Act cri­sis of the 1760s the Mass­a­chu­setts Provin­cial Con­gress con­sid­ered resis­tance to the king jus­ti­fied if free­dom came under attack from “the hand of oppres­sion” and “the mer­ci­less feet of tyranny.” A decade later the “indict­ment” of George III in the Dec­la­ra­tion of Inde­pen­dence sought to end his sov­er­eign reign over the colonies because he vio­lated the orig­i­nal con­sti­tu­tional contract.

As explained in legal his­to­rian Chris­t­ian Fritz’s descrip­tion of the role of the right of rev­o­lu­tion in Amer­i­can Rev­o­lu­tion, Amer­i­can inde­pen­dence was jus­ti­fied by con­ven­tional the­o­ries under Anglo-American con­sti­tu­tional thought at the time about the people’s col­lec­tive right to cast off an arbi­trary king. “Both nat­ural law and Eng­lish con­sti­tu­tional doc­trine gave the colonists a right to revolt against the sovereign’s oppres­sion.” But these under­stand­ings about the right of rev­o­lu­tion on the eve of the Amer­i­can Rev­o­lu­tion rested on a tra­di­tional model of government.

That model posited the exis­tence of a hypo­thet­i­cal bar­gain struck in the mists of antiq­uity between a king and a peo­ple. “In this bar­gain, the peo­ple were pro­tected by the monarch in exchange for the peo­ple giv­ing the king alle­giance. This was a con­trac­tual rela­tion­ship. Amer­i­can rev­o­lu­tion­ar­ies accused George III of breach­ing his implied duty of pro­tec­tion under that con­tract, thereby releas­ing the peo­ple in the colonies from their alle­giance. The sovereign’s breach of the hypo­thet­i­cal con­tract gave rise to the sub­jects’ right of revolution”—grounded on both nat­ural law and Eng­lish con­sti­tu­tional doctrine.”

Exam­ples of the right of rev­o­lu­tion as pos­i­tive law

Although many dec­la­ra­tions of inde­pen­dence seek legit­i­macy by appeal­ing to the right of rev­o­lu­tion, far fewer con­sti­tu­tions men­tion this right or guar­an­tee this right to cit­i­zens because of the desta­bi­liz­ing effect such a guar­an­tee would likely pro­duce. Among the exam­ples of an artic­u­la­tion of a right of rev­o­lu­tion as pos­i­tive law include:

1) The szlachta, nobles of the Polish-Lithuanian Com­mon­wealth, also main­tained a right of rebel­lion, known as rokosz.
2) New Hampshire’s constitution[29] guar­an­tees its cit­i­zens the right to reform gov­ern­ment, in Arti­cle 10 of the New Hamp­shire constitution’s Bill of Rights: When­ever the ends of gov­ern­ment are per­verted, and pub­lic lib­erty man­i­festly endan­gered, and all other means of redress are inef­fec­tual, the peo­ple may, and of right ought to reform the old, or estab­lish a new gov­ern­ment. The doc­trine of non­re­sis­tance against arbi­trary power, and oppres­sion, is absurd, slav­ish, and destruc­tive of the good and hap­pi­ness of mankind.
3) The Ken­tucky constitution[30] also guar­an­tees a right to alter, reform or abol­ish their gov­ern­ment in the Ken­tucky Bill of Rights:
All power is inher­ent in the peo­ple, and all free gov­ern­ments are founded on their author­ity and insti­tuted for their peace, safety, hap­pi­ness and the pro­tec­tion of prop­erty. For the advance­ment of these ends, they have at all times an inalien­able and inde­fea­si­ble right to alter, reform or abol­ish their gov­ern­ment in such man­ner as they may deem proper.
4) Sim­i­lar word­ing is used in Pennsylvania’s constitution,[31] under Arti­cle 1, Sec­tion 2 of the Dec­la­ra­tion of Rights:
All power is inher­ent in the peo­ple, and all free gov­ern­ments are founded on their author­ity and insti­tuted for their peace, safety and hap­pi­ness. For the advance­ment of these ends they have at all times an inalien­able and inde­fea­si­ble right to alter, reform or abol­ish their gov­ern­ment in such man­ner as they may think proper.
5) Arti­cle I, §2 of the Ten­nessee constitution[32] states: That gov­ern­ment being insti­tuted for the com­mon ben­e­fit, the doc­trine of non-resistance against arbi­trary power and oppres­sion is absurd, slav­ish, and destruc­tive of the good and hap­pi­ness of mankind.
6) North Carolina’s con­sti­tu­tion of Novem­ber 21, 1789 also con­tains in its Dec­la­ra­tion of Rights:[citation needed]
3d. That Gov­ern­ment ought to be insti­tuted for the com­mon ben­e­fit, pro­tec­tion and secu­rity of the peo­ple; and that the doc­trine of non-resistance against arbi­trary power and oppres­sion is absurd, slav­ish, and destruc­tive to the good and hap­pi­ness of mankind.
7) The Con­sti­tu­tion of Texas[33] also con­tains sim­i­lar word­ing in Arti­cle 1, Sect 2:
All polit­i­cal power is inher­ent in the peo­ple, and all free gov­ern­ments are founded on their author­ity, and insti­tuted for their ben­e­fit. The faith of the peo­ple of Texas stands pledged to the preser­va­tion of a repub­li­can form of gov­ern­ment, and, sub­ject to this lim­i­ta­tion only, they have at all times the inalien­able right to alter, reform or abol­ish their gov­ern­ment in such man­ner as they may think expe­di­ent.
8) The post-World War II Grundge­setz, the Fun­da­men­tal Law of the Fed­eral Repub­lic of Ger­many con­tains both entrenched, un-amendable clauses pro­tect­ing human and nat­ural rights, as well as a clause in its Arti­cle 20, rec­og­niz­ing the right of the peo­ple to resist tyranny, if all other mea­sures have failed.
5) The Greek Con­sti­tu­tion, in Arti­cle 120, states that “[…] it is both the right and the duty of the peo­ple to resist by all pos­si­ble means against any­one who attempts the vio­lent abo­li­tion of the Constitution.”

Sum­mery: pend­ing dis­cus­sion and com­ments, send to doolittb@aol.com.

Con­sol­i­dated and Pre­pared as directed by “PEARL” …/…/evaluation-of-administrative-regulations-and-liabilities

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Single to Double Jeopardy

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Distinctive Currency

Yurok Price List

Wampum, ke‘kwuk, squau-tho-won; all are Algo­nquian words for shell beads or string of shell beads. Wampum­peage is a Nar­ra­gansett word for “white beads strung”.

Through­out north­east­ern Amer­ica, wampum was used for jew­elry, gifts, com­mu­ni­ca­tion, his­tor­i­cal record of impor­tant events, reli­gious cer­e­monies, and trade. It was the ear­li­est form of cur­rency known in North America.

Its value was derived from the dif­fi­culty involved in pro­duc­ing the cylin­dri­cal bead from both Qua­hog and Whelk, and the scarcity of suit­able shells. White beads were made from Whelk, purple-blackish from Quahog.

The beads were pro­duced from the inner spi­ral of the shells. The spi­ral or columna must be thick enough to with­stand grind­ing, shap­ing and drilling. The shells were col­lected along the coastal shores dur­ing the sum­mer, and worked in the win­ter months.

The inner spi­rals were cut into cylin­ders mea­sur­ing 1/4 inch long by 1/8 inch diam­e­ter. Each bead was then smoothed through grind­ing, pol­ished, drilled, and finally strung on hemp fibers or sinew. It was dif­fi­cult, tedious, and time con­sum­ing work. The pro­por­tion­ate scarcity of the Qua­hog dark beads dou­bled their value to that of white wampum.

Though wampum is most often asso­ci­ated with the Iro­quois, and there are claims that the Iro­quois were the first pro­duc­ers of wampum beads, it is more likely that the Iro­quois were intro­duced to wampum by trade. The Iro­quois lived in the inte­rior, whereas sea shells could be found only in the coastal regions.

The Nar­ra­gansetts were most prob­a­bly the first pro­duc­ers of wampum, with other coastal Algo­nquians, includ­ing the Delaware, fol­low­ing shortly thereafter.

Wampum was a firmly estab­lished base of cur­rency by the time of increased Euro­pean colo­nial set­tle­ments in the 17th cen­tury. Though it did have a mon­e­tary value, its sole pur­pose for the colo­nials, it was by no means lim­ited to an eco­nomic role. As stated above, wampum was used for a mul­ti­tude of pur­poses, not least of which was the bind­ing truth to words “writ­ten” in wampum.

So respected and impor­tant was it that an accom­pa­ny­ing belt of wampum gave great solem­nity to mes­sages, speeches, and agreements.

A mes­sage deliv­ered via a wampum belt is said to have been greater than a thou­sand words, and it was accepted as truth. It was the seal, the proof of covenants made. The old­est extant wampum belt is the Huron belt given to the Jesuits to com­mem­o­rate the first mis­sion house built in Huro­nia. Offered and accepted in 1638, the Huron belt is cur­rently housed in the Vatican.

With the influx of more Euro­peans in the 17th cen­tury, notably the Dutch and Eng­lish, metal tools became widely avail­able to Indi­ans in the east. Among these tools were slen­der metal drills which greatly facil­i­tated the pro­duc­tion of wampum.

These new tools enabled the Indi­ans to pro­duce uni­form beads more quickly and with greater ease. Apply­ing basic eco­nomic prin­ci­ples to wampum as a commodity/currency in the 17th cen­tury, it might be assumed that wampum decreased in value as its pro­duc­tion was sped up.

On the con­trary, its value remained sta­ble. Again apply­ing the basic eco­nomic rule of sup­ply and demand, though the Euro­peans brought tools that helped to increase wampum pro­duc­tion, they also bal­anced their con­tri­bu­tion with an increased demand for the shell beads.

Wampum remained the stan­dard legal ten­der of both Indi­ans and New Eng­land colonists until nearly the end of the 17th cen­tury. It was, in the words of New Eng­land eco­nomic his­to­rian William Wee­den, “the mag­net which drew the beaver out of the inte­rior forests.”

Though the New Eng­lan­ders prized it solely for its eco­nomic value, the Algo­nquians and Iro­quois con­tin­ued to uti­lize wampum for orna­men­ta­tion, com­mu­ni­ca­tion, cer­e­mo­nial use, and as a reminder of the solem­nity of agreements.

For com­mu­ni­ca­tion pur­poses, wampum remained the “bead” of choice. Run­ners car­ried wampum belts from one vil­lage to another bring­ing news. The recip­i­ents of these mes­sages knew as the run­ner approached whether or not he brought tid­ings of great joy, or that he was the bearer of bad news. A belt pri­mar­ily worked in white beads was a good sign. A belt with a pre­dom­i­nance of pur­ple was cause for fear and appre­hen­sion. It may mean war, dis­as­ter, or a death announcement.

Orna­men­ta­tion uses of wampum included bracelets, anklets, neck­laces, belts, straps, and head­bands. Dec­o­ra­tive items of wampum were signs of wealth. One who wore sev­eral adorn­ing items of wampum was a well off, or respected per­son. Sachems would have need of much wampum, as they had need of many other valu­able possessions.

An expec­ta­tion of a New Eng­land sachem was that he be a gen­er­ous gift giver. A gift of any of these was much appre­ci­ated, deserv­ing of a fine return (the term “Indian giver” arose from the Indian cus­tom to expect a gift in return for a gift).

A woman would often have wampum ear­rings, per­haps a sash, and anklets. Delaware women fre­quently wore belts and head­bands of woven strands of wampum, while the Iro­quois and Mohi­cans, men and women, favored sev­eral sin­gle strand wampum necklaces.

As the New Eng­land colonists adopted wampum as their stan­dard cur­rency, inci­dents of fraud (wampum coun­ter­feit) increased. Both Indian and Eng­lish­man were known to pass off infe­rior or fraud­u­lent wampum to unsus­pect­ing colo­nials. In time, reg­u­la­tion and a stan­dard­ized mea­sure of wampum strands was imple­mented. A fathom (6 feet) was the most usual mea­sure­ment and instantly denoted a spe­cific mon­e­tary value mea­sured against Eng­lish shillings, pence, pounds, and so forth.

The fact that leg­is­la­tion was intro­duced, reg­u­la­tions regard­ing wampum man­u­fac­ture were set down, penal­ties for coun­ter­feit or infe­rior qual­ity wampum trad­ing were harsh, and in some colonies the rejec­tion of dark wampum for only white (though its value was greater, it was eas­ier to coun­ter­feit by way of dye), all illus­trate how depen­dent the colonists and Indi­ans were on these shell beads.

There was some fluc­tu­a­tion in wampum’s value, as is always the case with cur­rency, but by and large, it remained uni­formly accept­able and desir­able to nearly the end of the 17th cen­tury in the colonies and into the 18th cen­tury along the fron­tiers. Its worth, how­ever, was tenable.

Wampum was only good as long as the Indi­ans prized it. If or when that was no longer the case, an eco­nomic crash could occur through­out the Eng­lish colonies that would have had seri­ous con­se­quences in New Eng­land, and sub­se­quently, in the mother coun­try as well. It was this real­iza­tion, along with the declin­ing demand for fur, that moved the New Eng­lan­ders to grad­u­ally phase out wampum as a cur­rency stan­dard. With sil­ver from the West Indies begin­ning to cir­cu­late in North Amer­ica, wampum was slowly being replaced by that uni­ver­sally val­ued com­mod­ity, metal coinage.

The Mohi­cans and Mohawk both oper­ated as bro­kers in the wampum exchange through­out the 17th cen­tury. It was a lucra­tive ven­ture to all involved, a point that is high­lighted by Mohawk frus­tra­tion at their inabil­ity to access the wampum pro­duc­ing coastal tribes dur­ing the Mohican/Dutch alliance.

It was impor­tant enough to be the object of diplo­macy and com­pro­mise dur­ing the treaty dis­cus­sions in which the Dutch medi­ated. (The Dutch even tried their hand at pro­duc­ing wampum beads, but the Indi­ans would not accept it, thereby mak­ing it use­less.) The result­ing agree­ment upheld the Mohi­cans pos­ses­sion of their Hud­son Val­ley lands and rights to the fur trade, while the Mohawk were to be per­mit­ted to cross these lands to access the wampum mak­ers. Both tribes traded wampum to oth­ers in the west and north, and were major sup­pli­ers to the Seneca.

By the mid 18th cen­tury, dur­ing the French and Indian War, the use of wampum as cur­rency had declined so much that the Indi­ans them­selves were reject­ing it as pay­ment. They too wanted sil­ver in exchange for their furs and ser­vices, and would often turn to the Dutch set­tle­ments, rather than the Eng­lish, for their trad­ing ventures.

Wampum remained long in use for orna­men­ta­tion pur­poses, though even in this area it began to decline. More and more trade items were being adapted to suit the styles and tra­di­tions of Indian peo­ple in the east. Wampum belts, how­ever, as proof of good will and bind­ing agree­ments, continued.

Some Indian peo­ple still pos­sess the belts their ances­tors wove to record and com­mem­o­rate events and covenants of ear­lier days. With great respect, these belts are kept by the people.

Wampum belts that serve as solemn reminders of past agree­ments are still extant. The most famous of these is the Iro­quois Covenant belt, given in 1794 to the Iro­quois Con­fed­er­acy by the United States gov­ern­ment to mark the great covenant between the two nations.

It is inter­est­ing, if not ironic, to note that wampum remains valu­able even today. A sin­gle wampum bead made from Qua­hog or Whelk, man­u­fac­tured in New Eng­land coastal areas can cost up to $10! Over­seas wampum is less expen­sive, but still demands a good price. Wampum, the first cur­rency of the new world, has sur­vived as a desired item long enough to be con­sid­ered a classic.

dis·tinct — adj
1. Read­ily dis­tin­guish­able from all oth­ers; dis­crete: on two dis­tinct occasions.
2. Eas­ily per­ceived by the senses or intel­lect; clear: a dis­tinct flavor.
3. Clearly defined; unques­tion­able: at a dis­tinct disadvantage.
4. Very likely; prob­a­ble: There is a dis­tinct pos­si­bil­ity that she won’t come.
5. Notable: a dis­tinct honor and high privilege.
dis­tinc­tive — adj
1. serv­ing or tend­ing to distinguish
2. Char­ac­ter­is­tic of one per­son or thing, and so serv­ing to dis­tin­guish it from others.

cur·ren·cy — n
1. Money in any form when in actual use as a medium of exchange, espe­cially cir­cu­lat­ing paper money.
2. Trans­mis­sion from per­son to per­son as a medium of exchange; cir­cu­la­tion: coins now in currency.
3. Gen­eral accep­tance or use; preva­lence: the cur­rency of a slang term.

Ref­er­ences
See Crosby for doc­u­ments and Moss­man for excel­lent recent cov­er­age. On Sea­want and Peag
see the def­i­n­i­tions in the Oxford Eng­lish Dic­tio­nary. Also see J. Earl Massey, “Early Money Sub­sti­tutes,” in Stud­ies on Money in Early Amer­ica , ed. by Eric New­man and Richard Doty, New York: Amer­i­can Numis­matic Soci­ety, 1976, pp. 15–24; Don Taxay, Money of the Amer­i­can Indi­ans and Other Prim­i­tive Cur­ren­cies of the Amer­i­cas,New York; Num­mus Press, 1970, espe­cially pp. 107–148, with the colo­nial infor­ma­tion on pp. 133–136; and on New York, John. M. Klee­berg, “The New York in Amer­ica Token” in  Money of Pre-Federal Amer­ica,   edited by John M. Klee­berg, Coinage of the Amer­i­cas Con­fer­ence, held at the Amer­i­can Numis­matic Soci­ety May 4, 1991, Pro­ceed­ings no. 7, New York: Amer­i­can Numis­matic Soci­ety, 1992, pp. 15–57 on p. 35.

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